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NOTES 
CORRECTIVE ADVERTISING AND THE FTC: No, Virginia, 
Wonder Bread Doesn't Help Build Strong 
Bodies Twelve Ways 
The makers of Wonder Bread have been advertising that their 
product "helps build strong bodies twelve ways" for as long as most 
people can remember. Commercial after commercial has shown 
representatives of the nation's youth springing to ninety per cent of 
their adult height, ostensibly under the product's remarkable influ-
ence. Small wonder then that Wonder Bread is today an American 
institution. Recently the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) dealt the 
product's devotees a crushing blow. The Commission charged that 
the bread is no more nutritious than any other bread made with en-
riched flour and that it contains only eight elements that could 
possibly help build bodies.1 
The normal procedure in deceptive advertising cases is for the 
Commission to order the ·wrongdoer to cease and desist making de-
ceptive claims.2 However, in the case of Wonder Bread,3 and more 
recently for several other products,4 the FTC has gone a step farther 
and proposed "corrective advertising." Corrective advertising is de-
signed to inform consumers that previous advertising by the com-
pany was deceptive. In theory, corrective advertising expunges the 
effects left on the market place by deceptive advertising. In the case 
of Wonder Bread, these residual effects might take the form of 
continued consumer reliance on the bread's nutritional value and 
the company's continued profit from that reliance. If the FTC up-
holds the complaint, the company would be required to devote a 
portion of its future advertising to disclosing that it had made mis-
leading nutritional claims. Wonder Bread might as a result become 
something less of an American institution. 
I. Enriched flour has been available for 30 years, so its use in breads docs not 
represent a significant nutritional advance. Complaint at 9, ITT Continental Baking 
Co. (FTC Docket No. 8860, 1971) [hereinafter Continental Baking Complaint]. The 
Commission alleges that the following amounts of Wonder Br<!ad, depending upon 
sex and age, must be consumed daily by children in order to obtain the recommended 
dietary allowance of the nutrients that Wonder Bread does provide: calcium, 40 to 
68 slices; iron, 18 to 33 slices; niacin, 13 to 27 slices; phosphorus, 24 to 40 slices; 
protein, 12 to 23 slices; riboflavin 12 to 25 slices; thiamine, 7 to 15 slices. Continental 
Baking Complaint, supra at 9. 
2. The ITC's authority stems from § 5(a)-(b) of the Federal Trade Commiseion 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)-(b) (1970), which basically declares "unfair methods of competi-
tion" to be "unlawful," empowers the Commission to find "deceptive acts or practices" 
"unfair," and authorizes the ITC to issue cease-and-desist orders to stop the deceptive 
practices. 
3. The Wonder Bread case involves more than just Wonder Bread. See text accom-
panying notes 18-20 infra; note 19 infra. 
4. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 9, 10 &: 17 infra. 
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This Note will outline the development and theory of cor-
rective advertising. In particular, it will discuss the residual effects 
of deceptive advertising, which are the basis for a corrective remedy. 
The Commissiorfs statutory authority to require corrective advertis-
ing will then be explored: the analysis will compare corrective ad-
vertising ,vith other types of affirmative disclosure required by the 
Commission and relate it to the present use of divestiture as a trade 
regulation remedy. Finally, the possible public benefit accruing from 
corrective advertising will be considered, along with some thoughts 
on what policies the FTC should pursue in order to maximize that 
benefit. 
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF CORRECTIVE ADVERTISING 
The concept of corrective advertising was first formally pre-
sented to the FTC by a group of law students. Rallying under the 
acronymic banner of SOUP (Students Opposing Unfair Practices, 
Inc.), students attempted to intervene in Campbell Soup Co.5 as rep-
resentatives of what they saw as the public interest. The proceedings 
concerned Campbell's practice of adding marbles to its soups before 
showing them in television commercials. The effect of this ploy was 
to displace the solid ingredients and thereby give the products a de-
ceptively rich appearance. SOUP contended that merely ordering an 
end to the deception would not provide sufficient protection of the 
public interest. They argued that consumers who had relied on the 
apparently bounteous nature of the soups should be informed by 
Campbell of the past deception.6 The Commission denied SOUP 
permission to intervene because corrective advertising, at least in the 
case at hand, was not worth pursuing.7 Campbell agreed to a simple 
cease-and-desist order. 
Four months and one chairman later,8 a majority of the Com-
mission on its own initiative endorsed the concept of corrective 
advertising. In two deceptive advertising cases, the Commission issued 
proposed complaints, which would require respondents not only to 
cease making all~gedly deceptive claims, but also to devote twenty-
five per cent of their advertising during the next year to correcting 
the consumer misunderstanding resulting from those claims. In Stan-
dard Oil Co. of California,0 the company was accused of overstating 
the antipollutant value of its gasoline additive, F-310. In Coca-Cola 
5. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,I 19,261 (FTC 1970). 
6. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,r 19,261, at 21,423 • 
. 7. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] C:CH TRADE REG. REP. ,I 19,261, at 21,424. 
8, On Sept. 15,'19.70, Miles -W. Kirkpatrick replaced Caspar W. Weinberger as FTC 
chairman. Campbell Soup had been decided May 25, 1970. 
9. 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1f 19,352 {FTC 1970): - . . , . . 
376 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 70:374 
Co.,10 the company was cited for making deceptive nutritional claims 
for Hi-C fruit drink. Both companies would be required under the 
proposed orders to include in their corrective advertising a disclo• 
sure that the FTC had found their past advertising to contain false, 
misleading, and deceptive statements.11 
Shortly after the issuance of these proposed complaints, SOUP 
sought to intervene in an ongoing Commission action, Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co.12 At the time, hearings were beginning before a trial 
examiner on FTC charges that Firestone had indulged in deceptive 
advertising concerning the safety and prices of its tires. Armed with 
the Standard Oil and Coca-Cola complaints, SOUP argued that Fire-
stone was another instance in which the public interest required 
corrective advertising. The Commission, stating that it wished to 
"clarify" its position in Campbell Soup,13 allowed intervention.14 
In arguments before the FTC trial examiner,1G SOUP urged that 
Firestone be required to notify tire purchasers that safety claims 
previously made for the products could not be substantiated. The 
Association of National Advertisers, Inc., was also allowed to inter-
vene for the purpose of presenting the case against corrective adver-
tising. The trial examiner eventually concluded that Firestone had 
deceptively advertised the safety value of its tires but that a sufficient 
showing had not been made regarding the need for corrective ad-
vertising.16 
Soon after the onset of Firestone hearings, the Commission began 
issuing other corrective advertising complaints, all aimed at major 
national advertisers.17 Of these, only ITT Continental Baking 
Co.18 has reached any resolution. In a significant development, that 
10. 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 19,351 (FTC 1970). 
11. Coca-Cola Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 19,351, at 21,484 (FTC 1970); Standard 
Oil Co. of California, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 19,352, at 21,485 (FTC 1970). 
12. 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 19,373 (FTC 1970). 
13. 3 CCH TRADE REG, REP. 1[ 19,373, at 21,501. 
14. 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,r 19,373, at 21,502. This was the first time the FTC 
allowed intervention by a public interest group. Of late such intervention is occurring 
at all levels of government and is a phenomenon worthy of study in its own right. 
15. Firestone Tire &: Rubber Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1J 19,773 (FTC 1971). 
16. 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1J 19,773, at 21,814-15. 
17. E.g., American Home Prods. Corp., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1J 19,673 (FTC 
1971) (alleged deceptive advertising of Easy-Off Window Cleaner, Easy-On Speed Starch, 
Aerowar Floor Wax, and Black Flag Ant and Roach Killer); Amstar Corp., 3 CCH 
TRADE REG. REP. ,r 19,696 (FTC 1971) (alleged deceptive advertising through false 
nutritional claims for Domino and Spreckels sugar); Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc,, 3 
CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,r 19,477 (FTC 1971) (alleged false description of cranberry 
beverage as a juice and false description of the beverage's nutrient content); Warner• 
Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 19,838 (FTC 1971) (alleged 
deceptive advertising of Listerine "as a cure, preventative and treatment for colds and 
sore throats"). 
18. 3 CCH TRADE REc. REP. 1J 19,539 (FTC 1971). 
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company signed a consent order in which it agreed to devote "not 
less than 25 per cent of the expenditures (excluding production 
costs) for each media in each market ... to advertising in a manner 
approved by the authorized representatives of the Federal Trade 
Commission that Profile [Bread] is not effective for weight reduction, 
contrary to possible interpretations of prior advertising."19 The Pro-
file settlement agreement made no provision for a disclosure in the 
advertisements that the company had been found by the FTC to 
have advertised deceptively. In September 1971 Continental Baking 
aired its first corrective advertisement for Profile, with no such dis-
closure.20 
II. THE RESIDUAL EFFECTS 
In each of the corrective advertising cases that await adjudication, 
the Commission's case will be predicated on a showing that not only 
were the respondent's advertising campaigns deceptive,21 but also 
that the deception produced residual effects on the market place.22 
These residual effects may be manifested through continued reliance 
19. ITT Continental Baking Co., Decision and Order (FTC Docket No. 2-2015, 
Aug. 17, 1971). Provisional acceptance of the order was reported in ITT Continental 
Baking Co,, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11 19,681 (FTC 1971). The remainder of the 
complaint against Continental alleging deceptive nutritional claims for Wonder Bread 
and Hostess Snacks, along with the other corrective advertising complaints, is yet to 
be adjudicated. 
20. The text of the advertisement reads as follows: 
Hi, (Celebrity's Name), for Profile Bread. Like all mothers, I'm concerned about 
nutrition and balanced meals. So, I'd like to clear up any misunderstanding you 
may have about Profile Bread from its advertising or even its name. 
Does Profile have fewer calories than other breads? No. Profile has about the 
same per ounce as other breads. To be exact, Profile has seven fewer calories per 
slice. That's because Profile is sliced thinner. But eating Profile will not cause you 
to lose weight. A reduction of 7 calories is insignificant. It's total calories and 
balanced nutrition that count. And Profile can help you achieve a balanced meal 
because it provides protein and B vitamins as well as other nutrients. 
How does my family feel about Profile? Well-my husband likes Profile toast; 
the children love Profile sandwiches and I prefer Profile to any other bread. So 
you see, at our house, delicious taste makes Profile a family affair. 
Text of television advertisement, a copy of which is on file with the Michigan Law 
Review. The reader can judge for himself the extent to which such an advertisement 
will be effective in dispelling the effects of past claims. 
21. It is by no means a foregone conclusion that the claims made in some of these 
advertising campaigns will be found deceptive. For example, Standard Oil of California 
seems to be prepared to argue vigorously for the merits of F-310. See their two-page 
response to the Commission's charges in Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1970, at 20-21 (Midwest 
ed.). 
22. Two FTC complaints provide that if it is shown that the ban on deceptive 
practices "is inadequate fully to protect the public or the firms' competitors," then 
the FTC may require corrective advertising providing a disclosure that past practices 
were false or deceptive. American Home Prods. Corp., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 
11 19,673, at 21,721 (FTC 1971); Amstar Corp., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11 19,696, at 
21,742 (FTC 1971). However, one complaint does not specify that disclosure would be 
required only if the ban on deception is "inadequate," the implication being that no 
proof of residual market effect is necessary as a basis for requiring disclosure. Warner-
Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11 19,838, at 21,860 (FTC 1971). 
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by consumers on false information supplied by deceptive advertis-
ing or through a lasting economic advantage gained by the wrong-
doer over his competitors as a result of a successful deceptive 
campaign.23 
SOUP's task in the Firestone hearing24 was to demonstrate the 
existence of residual effects from the deceptive tire advertisements. 
Its arguments and evidence were directed primarily toward establish-
ing proof of continued consumer reliance. Little attention was given 
to demonstrating any resulting shift in Firestone's share of the tire 
market. SOUP produced as an expert witness Doctor Darrell B. 
Lucas, a licensed psychologist and marketing expert. Doctor Lucas 
testified that since regular advertising reaches the prospective con-
sumer at a time and place not appropriate for making a purchase 
or response, to be effective it must leave some impression upon his 
memory until there is occasion to buy.25 This retention could be 
either conscious or subconscious.20 However, Doctor Lucas did not 
feel that he could predict for any particular advertising campaign, 
like that of Firestone, how long memory will persist for a given 
performance claim.27 The other intervener in the case, the Associa-
tion of National Advertisers, produced a battery of experts to coun-
ter Doctor Lucas' testimony. They expressed doubt whether anyone 
could demonstrate that a particular representation of the perform-
ance or character of a product or service will, in fact, persist "for a 
given or substantial time" after use of the advertisement has been 
terminated.28 
SOUP's other expert, Doctor Douglas F. Greer, an economist, 
was willing to be more specific. Doctor Greer testified that advertis-
23. Of course, these two manifestations are intimately related, Consumer reliance 
results in retained market share through two mechanisms: (1) consumers remember 
and continue to rely on a deceptive claim in their buying, and (2) consumers switch 
to the product because of the deceptive claim and habitually buy it, even though they 
have since forgotten the claim that caused them to switch in the first place, 
24. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ~ 19,673 (FTC Docket 
No. 8818, 1971) (excerpt of initial hearing examiner's decision). 
25. Transcript at 412, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG, REP. 
11 19,673 (FTC Docket No. 8818, 1971) [hereinafter Firestone Transcript], 
26. Firestone Transcript, supra note 25, at 417-19. The subconscious form can 
manifest itself, Dr. Lucas testified, in what is known as the "sleeper effect," This means 
that an individual can receive impressions from a source that he docs not credit as 
being particularly important (and advertising is often in that category). These im-
pressions may carry o\'er e\'en though they are not accepted fully at the time they arc 
made; at some later date, when the individual has forgotten the source of an impression, 
he may assume that it was told to him by a more important source, 
27. Firesfone Transcript, supra note 25, at 531-32. 
28. See Initial Decision, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., FTC Docket No. 8818, at 
25-30 (Aug. 17, 1971). There were those in the advertising industry who questioned 
whether this argument against corrective advertising was not "terrifically short sighted 
and self defeating" on the grounds it would make it easier for advertising's critics to 
say that even advertisers do not have much faith in its long-term effectiveness, Edi• 
torial, Advertising Age, March 29, 1971, at 12, col. 2. 
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ing outlays should be vie,ved as a form of capital investment that· 
depreciates over time. 29 He put forward an econometric model that 
purported to measure the dollar value of the benefit that is derived 
in future years from a given expenditure on advertising.30 Doctor 
Greer believed that the Firestone advertising was of the sort that 
would provide such future value. However, it was not possible for 
him, with the information and techniques at hand, to measure 
quantitatively the effect of a particular advertising claim on the sales 
of a specific line of tires.31 
Both of SOUP's experts were thus faced on cross-examination 
with a demand for greater specificity to which they were largely un-
able to respond. Attempts by expert witnesses to demonstrate the 
psychological effects of advertising are handicapped by the unsettled 
nature of the disciplines from which their theories are drawn. Much 
of the testimony they do offer will meet with skepticism from those 
in the legal profession who are wary of such social science testimony, 
on the grounds that it is difficult to substantiate and subject to 
change.32 
Although the FTC will no doubt make some use of similar expert 
testimony in the various corrective advertising cases, its main argu-
ment might be expected to involve the other manifestation of 
residual effects-shift in market share.33 Theories in this area may 
29. Firestone Transcript, supra note 25, at 576. 
30. For example, if Dr. Greer's model yielded a depredation coefficient of .45, an 
advertising campaign on which 20 million dollars was spent during 1968 would provide 
















Adapted from SOUP Exhibit No. 4, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 3,CCH TRADE REc. 
REP. 1J 19,673 (FTC 1971). 
31. Firestone Transcript, supra note 25, at 607. 
32. See Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 150, 167 (1955) ("[S]ince the 
behavioral sciences are so very young, imprecise, and changeful, tbeir findings have an 
uncertain expectancy of life. Today's sanguine asseveration may be cancelled by tomor-
row's new revelation-or new technical fad."). 
33. A recent development might force tbe Commission to argue Coca-Cola (see 
text accompanying note 10 supra) exclusively on' a gain-in-market-share basis. Since 
tbe original complaint, Coca-Cola greatly added to the vitamin C content in Hi-C. 
Now, the label announces, a six-ounce serving of NEW Hi-C contains 333% of the 
minimum daily adult requirement for the vitamin. The company seems to be preparing 
to argue that past nutritional claims are no longer the source of false reliance because 
tbe product now contains so much of the vitamin that no one is being deceived. The 
response from the Commission would have to be that the company should not be 
allowed to retain a market share which is the product of years o( illegal conduct. 
However, tbere could be some question, now tbat tbe product is so enriched, whether 
corrective advertising would ever be successful in divesting- Coca-Cola of its ill-gotten 
market share. · .. , . , 
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well prove more easily demonstrable. National advertisers carefully 
study the effects of their major campaigns.34 The FTC staff, with its 
broad investigatory powers,35 can obtain the results of such studies 
and presumably has the economic expertise to evaluate them. Rely-
ing heavily on respondents' own research data, the Commission 
might attempt to demonstrate that a given increase in market share 
is attributable to the deceptive campaign in question. The more 
difficult problem might be to demonstrate that it was the deceptive 
aspect of the advertising that caused the increased sales. The argu-
ment will no doubt be made that any expenditure of millions of 
dollars on a promotional campaign, regardless of its content, will 
result in an increased share of the market. To counter this conten-
tion, the Commission may again draw on material in respondents' 
own files consisting of reports and opinion surveys aimed at deter-
mining what aspect of a given promotional campaign was most 
effective in shifting market share. 
With the use of these techniques, the Commission should be able 
to· demonstrate the existence of residual effects. Its burden of proof 
on this point is not likely to be a heavy one. The determination of 
the existence of residual effects is clearly one of fact, and pursuant to 
the standard for judicial review enunciated in section 5(c) of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, any such determination by the 
FTC,.if supported by evidence, is conclusive.36 It is even conceivable 
that in reviewing Commission corrective advertising cases, the courts 
will allow a presumption of residual effects, based only on a demon-
stration that the advertising in question was deceptive. Analogous 
presumptions can be found in other deceptive advertising cases. It 
has been held that the Commission need not show that persons were 
actually deceived by a deceptive campaign, but only that there be 
the "likelihood of deception"37 or "the capacity to deceive."38 Simi-
34. According to the FTC, surveys commissioned by ITI' Continental Daking 
showed that certain of its television commercials for Wonder Dread generated a 
significant increase in the number of consumers who rated Wonder Dread excellent or 
very good as· compared with other breads in terms of the quality of nutrition and the 
value of the use of the bread by children. Continental Daking Complaint, supra note 
1, at 14. 
35. Section 6(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46(a) (1970), 
gives the FTC power 
To gather and compile information concerning, and to investigate from time to 
time the organization, business, conduct, practices, and management of any corpo• 
ration engaged in commerce, excepting banks and common carriers subject to the 
Act to regulate commerce, and its relation to other corporations and to individuals, 
associations, and partnerships. 
The FTC has already subpoenaed market-share data from Coca-Cola. The e.xaminer 
denied the company's motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum. 3 CCH TRADE REc. 
REP. ,I 19,750 (FTC 1971). 
36. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970). 
37. Montgomery Ward &: Co. v. FTG, 379 F.2d 660, 670 (7th Cir. 1967). 
38. Charles of the Ritz Dist. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944). 
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larly, once the Commission has established that a deceptive statement 
has been made, it can infer that trade was diverted from competitors 
who did not engage in unfair methods.89 Demonstration of residual 
effects thus should not prove to be a major obstacle. 
JII. CORRECTIVE ADVERTISING AS A FORM OF 
AFFIRMATIVE DISCLOSURE 
In denying intervention to SOUP in Campbell Soup, the Com-
mission indicated that any residual effects that might be present 
were not significant enough to justify the effort it would take to 
dispel them.40 The Commission did not preclude corrective adver-
tising requirements in future cases, given a sufficient finding of 
fact. Chairman Weinberger, ·writing for the majority, indicated a be-
lief that corrective advertising was consistent with the Commission's 
long-standing practice of requiring affirmative disclosures: 
[P]etitioner [souP] argues at length that the Commission has the 
power to require respondent to make affirmative disclosure in future 
advertisements of the deceptive practices discovered by the Com-
mission in order to alert the public to these practices. We have no 
doubt as to the Commission's power to require such affirmative dis-
closures when such disclosures are reasonably related to the 
deception found and are required in order to dissipate the effects 
of that deception.41 
To be sure, corrective advertising is a form of affirmative dis-
closure to the extent that it requires respondents to disclose certain 
information in their advertising. Much of the logic that has but-
tressed traditional affirmative disclosure orders supports the pro-
priety of corrective advertising as well. 
Federal Trade Commission orders of affirmative conduct, as con-
39. FTC v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149, 152 (1942). 
40. Campbell Soup Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,f 19,261, 
at 21,424 (ITC 1970). 
41. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH TRADE REc. REP. ,I 19,261, at 21,423. The 
Chairman's statement referred to two recent decisions concerning affirmative disclosure, 
All-State Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 423 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 
(1970), and Portwood v. FTC, 418 F.2d 419 (10th Cir. 1969). In All-State, the respondent 
was an aluminum-siding and storm-window company found to have engaged in bait 
and switch techniques. The court upheld a Commission order that all future customers 
be informed, by a statement handed to them at point of sale, that any instrument of 
indebtedness signed by them could be assigned without notice to a third party against 
whom the purchaser's claims or defenses might not be available. In Portwood, the 
court upheld an FTC order requiring a mail order philatelic business to disclose in its 
future dealings that the recipient of unsolicited merchandise is not required to pay 
for it. The disclosure settled upon concerning Profile Bread in ITT Continental 
Baking (see text accompanying notes 18-20 supra) bears a strong resemblance to these 
disclosures. Corrective advertising, which would require acknowledgment that the 
respondent had advertised in a false and deceptive manner in the past, carries affirma-
tive disclosure a step further. 
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trasted with mere prohibitions of further illegal conduct, have been 
the object of heightened judicial scrutiny.42 The leading case limit-
ing affirmative disclosure is Alberty v. FTC.43 In that case the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that the 
Commission acted improperly when it required an affirmative dis-
closure in the advertising of iron tonic. The court objected to a 
required statement that "the condition of lassitude [sought to be 
alleviated by the product] is caused less frequently by simple iron 
deficiency anemia than by other causes, and ... in such cases, this 
preparation will not be effective in relieving it or correcting it."44 
The court maintained that Congress had not given power to the 
Commission "generally to do whatever is considered by it to be good 
and beneficial."45 In an unenlightening fashion the court specified 
the two situations in which an affirmative statement could be re-
quired: when "failure to make such statement is misleading because 
of the consequences from the use of the product," and when "failure 
to make such statement is misleading because of the things claimed 
in the advertisement."46 
Alberty, although never actually overruled, has not proved to be 
an impediment to the development of affirmative disclosure.47 Dur-
ing the years following Alberty, the Commission, cautiously at first,48 
tacked affirmative disclosure requirements onto its cease-and-desist 
orders in a wide variety of situations. Perhaps because of what was 
perceived as the ever-present specter of Alberty being revived, the 
development of affirmative disclosure was incremental and prag-
matic. As a result, the Commission and the courts have not articu-
lated any general principles to determine when affirmative disclosure 
should be required. It is, however, possible to isolate four types of 
situations in which affirmative disclosure has been invoked: (1) pro-
tection of consumer preferences, (2) regulation of future conduct, 
42. This scrutiny stems from the fact that the Commission's statutory authority is 
essentially negative, i.e., the power to issue a cease-and-desist order. See Federal Trade 
Commission Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970). The Commission nevertheless has not 
been averse to requiring affirmative conduct; it simply expresses the requirement in 
the negative. In the case of corrective advertising, one is enjoined from further 
advertising that does not contain a stipulated amount of corrective content. 
43. 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1950). 
44. 182 F .2d at 39. 
45. 182 F.2d at 38. 
46. 182 F.2d at 39. 
47. See J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967) (Albany-type dis-
closure upheld against makers of Geritol); Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960); 
Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960); Ward Labs,, 
Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960); Lemke, Souped 
Up Affirmative Disclosure Orders of the Federal Trade Commission, 4 U, MICH, J. LAW 
REF. 180, 184 (1970). 
48. See Sweeny, False .Advertising of Food, Drugs and Cosmetics, 12 FooD Dauo 
CosM, L.J. 606, 608 (1957). 
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(3) danger warnings, and (4) counteraction of widely held false be-
liefs. While this classification is overlapping and is admittedly not 
the only one possible, it does furnish a framework for studying 
how the various arguments for affirmative disclosure might be ex-
panded to include corrective advertising. 
Consumers have certain preferences in their purchases of goods. 
Whether or not such preferences can be rationally justified, the FTC 
has found that failure to disclose facts material to those preferences 
can be an unfair trade practice. The Commission has deter-
mined, for example, that purchasers of goose feathers prefer them 
new, rather than secondhand, so the latter must be labeled.49 Simi-
larly, finding that car owners prefer virgin crude motor oil, the 
Commission decided that "rerefined" oil, although chemically iden-
tical to the virgin form, must be identifi.ed.60 
Popular preferences have been divined that have little to do 
with the product itself but relate instead to the identity of the 
manufacturer, as in L. Heller & Son v. FTC.61 In that case the 
court determined that Americans have· a general preference for pro-
ducts produced in the United States and that failure to indicate 
that imitation pearls were imported from the Orient was an unfair 
trade practice. 52 In 1967, the Commission seemed to extend the 
principle of recognized consumer preferences when it issued a com-
plaint against a group of Virginia real estate management fi.rms.53 
The FTC charged that it was an unfair trade practice to fail to 
disclose in advertisements for apartments that the units were not 
available to black applicants. 54 Ostensibly, this was based on the 
notion that the racial policies of the management are material to 
potential tenants in their choice of housing. 
These later cases raise the question whether the FTC is acting 
primarily to protect consumer preferences or whether it is actually 
seeking to create or encourage preferences for certain commodities 
49. Purofied Down Prods. Corp., 48 F.T.C. 155 (1951). 
50. Kerran v. FTC, 265 F.2d 246 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959). It 
could be questioned whether it is a proper allocation of Commission resources to 
protect this sort of irrational consumer preference. In fact, there might be a public 
policy favoring the use of recycled motor oil that such disclosures retard. However, 
there is a competing public policy that favors as much information in the hands of 
consumers as possible. The required labeling of rerefined oil might result in a dialogue 
on the relative merits of the products and, in the end, a greater degree of rationality 
in the market place. 
51. 191 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1951). 
52. 191 F.2d at 955. 
53. First Buckingham Community, Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH TRADE 
R.Ec. REP. 11 18,122 (FTC 1967). 
54. The respondents had advertised that rentals were without restrictions as to race, 
color, or national origin. The complaint was subsequently dismissed when the 
respondents changed their rental policies. First Buckingham Community, Inc., [1967-
1970 Transfer Binder] CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11 18,357 (FTC 1968). 
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or services in an attempt to further broad public policies. It is dif-
ficult to view Heller as anything but a Commission attempt at pro-
tectionism. The discriminatory rental case also suggests an attempt 
to further a particular social policy through consumer choice in the 
market place. 
Corrective advertising is itself a manifestation of a public policy 
favoring truthful advertising. 55 This policy might properly be pro-
moted through the popular preference construct. In this age of 
heightened "consumerism," there is often a preference among buyers 
for the products of those who advertise truthfully.50 The fact that 
a seller has been found by the Federal Trade Commission to have 
advertised in a deceptive manner is material to that preference. A 
number of American mothers, for example, might be interested in 
knowing that Wonder Bread does not help build their childrens' 
bodies twelve ways after all.57 To the extent that opponents of cor-
rective advertising complain of the overly damaging effects of such 
disclosures, they establish the existence of a consumer preference 
for the products of fair dealers. 
Affirmative disclosure is also justified when the Commission finds 
that only through such disclosure can the conduct of repeated 
offenders be effectively regulated. This idea was most recently recog-
nized in All-State Industries, Inc. v. FTC68 and Portwood v. FTC.69 
A similar use might be envisioned for corrective advertising. Some 
businesses with past records of unfair dealing may be too small to 
justify rigorous FTC surveillance. In such instances, corrective ad-
vertising might be used to warn consumers so that these small 
operators would find it more difficult to resurrect quietly their 
deceptive methods.60 In two recent cases, the Commission required 
55. See Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1005, 
1010 (1967). 
56. Cf. FTC v. Cinderella Career 8: Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1313 
(D.C. Cir. 1968). Industry apparently believes that there is also a consumer preference 
for the products of manufacturers who do not foul the environment. However, much of 
the environmental advertising is misleading and some of it is "blatantly false," Some 
recent examples are the following: (1) a Southern California Edison Company adver-
tisement depicting as a contented resident of power-plant waste a lobster said to have 
come from nowhere near the power plant; (2) a Standard Oil of California advertise• 
ment representing the Palm Springs Courthouse as a company research center; and 
(3) an advertisement stating that "Texaco prohibits the discharge of oil into the sea 
anywhere in the world," although a Texaco refinery spilled 200,000 gallons of diesel 
oil into Puget Sound in April of 1971. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1971, at 59, col. 5, 
Senator Spong has introduced a bill that calls for criminal penalties for deceptive 
advertising about products and services purporting to control air and water pollution. 
S. 927, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971). Corrective advertising would seem to be an excellent 
means of handling the problem. 
57. See note 1 supra and accompanying text. 
58. 423 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970), discussed in note 41 
supra. 
59. 418 F.2d 419 (10th Cir. 1969), discussed in note 41 supra. 
60. The case of the small operator presents, however, special problems for cor-
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respondents to disclose past FTC findings, seemingly in an attempt 
to block future illegal conduct. In Nelson James, Inc.,61 respondents 
were required for the next ten years to disclose to any prospective 
investors in their business dealings that they had left an aggregate 
of $277,768 in unpaid debts as a result of past operations.62 In 
Robert W. Ricklefs,63 a piano retailer signed a consent order con-
taining a provision that for one year after its effective date the firm 
would furnish a copy of the FTC's News Release with the order's 
terms to each newspaper or other medium used to promote sales. 64 
Corrective advertising might likewise be invoked when firms of 
any size have demonstrated such a propensity for unfair dealing that 
consumers can be adequately protected only if they are regularly 
reminded that they are dealing with a firm that has engaged in 
massive deception in the past. For example, the FTC had issued 
cease-and-desist orders against Firestone's previous deceptive cam-
paigns in 194165 and again in 1959.66 It is maintained that simple 
cease-and-desist orders are ineffective when used against certain 
hard-core offenders. Such firms react by merely developing a new 
form of deception, which will take the FTC several more years to 
stop.67 Corrective advertising, with its attendant negative publicity, 
is the only way to make such behavior unprofitable, given the 
present powers of the Federal Trade Commission.68 In framing a 
remedy on the basis of past conduct, the Commission must exercise 
some care. The line between deterring future misconduct and 
punishing past acts is often a thin one and punishment is clearly 
beyond the ambit of FTC authority.69 
rective advertising. The existence of residual effects on the market place would be 
difficult to prove, while for over-all policy reasons the Commission might wish to 
confine corrective advertising to major campaigns by major businesses. 
61. 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 'if 19,629 (ITC 1971) (consent order). 
62. 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 'if 19,629, at 21,680. 
63. 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 'if 19,632 (ITC 1971) (ITC complaint and proposed 
order). 
64. 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 'if 19,764 (ITC 1971) (consent order). 
65. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 33 F.T.C. 282 (1941). 
66. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 55 F.T.C. 1909 (1959). 
67. For example, the ITC spent over a decade attempting to force a correction in 
the advertising of Geritol. See ABA COMM. To STUDY THE ITC, REPORT 43 (1969) 
[hereinafter ABA REPORT]. 
68. Currently a firm engaged in an unfair or deceptive practice may continue to 
do so until a FTC cease-and-desist order has become final. The time elapsing between 
the initiation of a Commission investigation and a denial of certiorari is likely to be at 
least two years. Suggestions have frequently been made that the Commission be given 
power to seek preliminary injunctions in the federal district court to ban the alleged 
deceptive practice, pending final adjudication. See ABA REPORT, supra note 67, at 62. 
69. See ITC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952). One author, in a somewhat 
cavalier fashion, brands the corrective advertising proposed in Standard Oil (see text 
accompanying notes 9-11 supra) as basically "punitive" since the order was "so 
excessive that punishment rather than information appears to be the goal of the 
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Affirmative disclosure has also been required when the Commis• 
sion finds that consumers should be warned of potential bodily harm 
from use of a product. Warnings have been placed on everything 
from potentially dangerous drugs to ill-designed toys.70 Prominent 
of late were the FTC-required warnings on cigarette packages.71 In 
considering a warning required by the Commission on a medicinal 
preparation, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit com-
mented: 
If the Commission, having discretion to deal ·with these matters, 
thinks it is best to insist upon a form of advertising clear enough 
so that, in the words of the prophet Isaiah "wayfaring men, though 
fools, shall not err therein," it is not for the courts to revise its judg• 
ment.72 
If it does, in fact, fall so clearly within the Commission's province 
to decide when potential customers should be warned of the dangers 
in the use of products, there is little reason for not extending these 
warnings to prior purchasers who continue to rely on false safety 
and nutritional claims.73 So that he can readjust his driving accord-
ingly, the owner of a set of Firestone tires, for example, should be 
told that his car might not stop nv-enty-five per cent faster.74 It is 
likewise not inconceivable that one's health might be impaired by 
literal reliance on a deceptive nutritional claim when such reliance 
Commission." Lemke, supra note 47, at 192. He fails, however, to explicate his basis 
for concluding that the demands of corrective advertising were excessive. Moreover, 
any attempt to determine the Commission's "real intent" is nothing short of leaping 
into a metaphysical quagmire. One is reminded of the efforts of the Supreme Court 
during the 1930's to classify legislation as primarily "fiscal" or primarily "penal," 
See Cushman, Social and Economic Control Through Federal Taxation, 18 MINN, L, 
R.Ev. 759 (1934). 
70. See the summary of FTC rulings in 2 CCH TRADE REG, REP. 1i 7,549. 
71. The FTC rules concerning cigarettes had a stormy history. All such rules were 
superseded when Congress enacted the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 
Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331•40 (1970). 
72. Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942). 
73. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. 
74. In Firestone, SOUP claimed that, based on the company's own survey data, 
15,000 to 30,000 persons who purchased Firestone tires in 1968 would react to the de- ' 
ceptive advertising by driving differently than if they had tires of another manu-
facturer. Brief for Intervenor SOUP at 35-36, Firestone Tire &: Rubber Co., 3 CCH 
TRADE REG. REP. 1i 19,673 (FTC 1971). SOUP also produced as an expert witness 
Harvey L.P. Resnick, M.D., chief of the Center for Suicide Prevention of the National 
Institute of Mental Health. He testified on the basis of his clinical experience that an 
undetermined, but small, proportion of the car-driving population may be classified as 
high-risk takers, who tend to use equipment up to and beyond its safety limits, Fire• 
stone Transcript, supra note 25, at 838-39. In his opinion, those high-risk takers who 
believed the advertising that the tires would stop 25% quicker could be expected to 
drive less carefully. In addition, he maintained there arc a number of average-risk 
takers who would believe the 25% quicker claim and therefore could be e.xpccted to 
drive less carefully. Firestone Transcript, supra note 25, at 836•37. 
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takes the form of continued consumption of a product to the exclu-
sion of more nutritional foods.75 
The only distinction between the traditional warning case and 
one like Firestone is that in the former the risk of harm is inherent 
in the product, while in the latter the risk was created by the seller's 
deception. Just as the manufacturer of a product has a duty to make 
it as safe as is reasonably possible,76 one who creates a potentially 
dangerous situation through deceptive advertising should have a 
duty to take all reasonable steps to eliminate that risk. 
There are occasions when a potential for misunderstanding or 
deception does not stem directly from assertions made by the seller 
but is the unavoidable result of an erroneous belief held by a sig-
nificant number of consumers. In some instances, whether or not 
this belief was consciously fostered by the seller, affirmative dis-
closure may be required to free the situation of deception. This 
includes a broad range of affirmative disclosure cases. For example, 
the makers of Geritol claimed only that their product was a cure for 
iron deficiency anemia. Although this was true, the company was 
required to disclose in its advertising that iron deficiency anemia 
accounts for only a small fraction of the symptoms of chronic lassi-
tude.77 
For sixty years, the Royal Baking Powder Company manufactured 
a product containing cream of tartar and advertised widely its superi-
ority to phosphate baking powders. In 1919, because of the scarcity 
of cream of tartar, Royal changed its product to phosphate. The 
FTC held that it was an unfair trade practice to continue the use of 
the name "Dr. Price's Cream Baking Powder," even though a clause 
headed "A Pure Phosphate Powder" was printed in red diagonally 
across the back panel. In one of the early court decisions interpreting 
the Federal Trade Commission Act, Royal Baking Powder Co. v. 
FTC,78 the Second Circuit upheld the Commission's requirement 
that the word "phosphate" be added to the product name. The 
court, implicitly recognizing the lag effect of advertising, ruled that 
it was an unfair trade practice to make sales of an inferior product 
on the strength of a reputation attained through sixty years of adver-
75. The ITC charged that ITT Continental Baking intentionally aimed its 
nutritional claims for Hostess Snacks at those mothers who had been infrequent 
purchasers of snack cakes. Presumably relying on such claims, nutrition-conscious 
buyers substituted Hostess Snacks, which are composed primarily of sugar, for other 
foods that they had previously fed their children. Continental Baking Complaint, 
supra note 1, at 13. 
76. A manufacturer also has a duty to use reasonable care in his method of advertis-
ing and sale to avoid misrepresentation of the product. Failure to exercise such care 
constitutes tortious conduct. See W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 96, at 644 (1971). 
77. J.B. Williams Co. v. ITC, 881 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967). 
78. 281 F. 744 (2d Cir. 1922). 
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tising.70 "The purpose of the Congress in creating the Federal Trade 
Commission," wrote the court, "was aimed at just such dishonest 
practices .... "80 
The Waltham Watch Company had manufactured a popular 
brand of clocks in Massachusetts for nearly a century. When it 
ceased operations and merged with another firm, a "spin-off" began 
selling imported German clocks under the "Waltham" trade name. 
In Waltham Watch Co. v. FTC,81 the Seventh Circuit upheld an 
FTC-required affirmative disclosure in company advertising to in-
form the public that the clocks were no longer manufactured by the 
Waltham Watch Company of Waltham, Massachusetts. In both 
Royal Baking Powder and Waltham, the courts clearly recognized 
the effects of prior marketing efforts of a firm on the present buying 
habits of consumers. It was deemed illegal to take advantage of this 
residual effect of advertising through a failure to disclose that there 
was no longer any basis for the consumers' beliefs. The same logic 
supports a corrective advertising requirement. If there is any distinc-
tion between affirmative disclosure and corrective advertising in 
this respect, it is that in cases like Royal Baking Powder and 
Waltham the products' reputations were at one time accurate, 
whereas in cases involving Hi-C82 and Profile Bread83 the consumer 
was led to form an opinion that never had a basis in fact. Certainly 
there is even less justification for allowing sales based on a reputation 
that was initially false. 
The practice of corrective advertising can be justified by many 
of the arguments that have been used to require other forms of 
affirmative disclosure. Traditionally, however, affirmative disclosure 
has been most concerned with preventing future deception. Correc-
tive advertising more directly focuses on expunging the effects of 
past deception, in terms of continued consumer reliance and shift in 
market share. In theory, it would appear to represent an extension 
of the FTC's sphere of activity in regulating advertising. The Com-
mission will have to demonstrate the propriety of this extension. 
IV. THE EXTENT OF FTC DISCRETION To REQUIRE CORRECTIVE 
ADVERTISING 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act84 is the basis of 
the Commission's jurisdiction over deceptive advertising. The FTC 
is therein "empowered and directed to prevent ... unfair methods 
79. 281 F. at 753. 
80. 281 F. at 753. 
81. 318 F.2d 28 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944 (1963). 
82. See note 33 supra; te.xt accompanying note 10 supra. 
83. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra. 
84. 15 u.s.c. § 45 (1970). 
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of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in commerce."85 The Commission has great latitude not only in the 
finding of facts86 but also in the framing of remedies. In Jacob Siegal 
Co. v. FTC,81 the Supreme Court laid dmvn the standard that the 
Commission's remedy need only have a "reasonable relation" to the 
unlawful practices found to exist,88 a standard often relied upon.89 
The justification for allowing such wide discretion to the FTC in 
shaping remedies is usually based on two factors: the expertise 
attributed to the Commission and the broad language of the Com-
mission's statutory mandate. In FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,00 
Chief Justice Warren wrote: "[A]s an administrative agency which 
deals continually with cases in the area, the Commission is often in 
a better position than are courts to determine when a practice is 
'deceptive' within the meaning of the Act."91 
Because of this assumed expertise, courts uphold FTC actions 
unless there is a showing that the Commission acted arbitrarily,92 
clearly abused its discretion,93 or failed to make an "allowable 
judgment"94 in its choice of remedies. Complementing the recogni-
tion of Commission expertise is the fact that the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, unlike the enabling acts of other administrative 
agencies, specifies no categories of practices within which the 
agency's orders must be confined.95 The Chief Justice further wrote 
in Colgate-Palmolive: 
It is important to note the generality of these standards of illegality; 
the proscriptions in§ 5 are flexible, "to be defined with particularity 
by the myriad of cases from the field of business." 
This statutory scheme necessarily gives the Commission an influ-
ential role in interpreting § 5 and in applying it to the facts of 
particular cases arising out of unprecedented situations.90 
85. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970). 
86. See Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 274 (1965); FTC v. Standard 
Education Society, 202 U.S. 112 (1927); FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1924). 
87. 227 U.S. 608 (1946). 
88. 227 U.S. at 612. 
89. See, e.g., FTC v. National Lead Co., 252 U.S. 419, 429 (1957); FTC v. Ruberoid 
Co., 242 U.S. 470 (1952); P.F. Collier &: Son Corp. v. FTC, 427 F.2d 261, 276 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970); Kent v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1246, 1250 (5th Cir. 1970). 
90. 280 U.S. 274 (1965). 
91. 380 U.S. at 285. But see Developments, supra note 55, at 1029. 
92. See Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 461, 497 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,. 261 
U.S. 884 (1959). 
93. See Independent Directory Corp. v. FTC, 188 F.2d 468, 470 (2d Cir. 1951) •. 
94. See Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 821, 826 (7th Cir. 1951). 
95. See Comment, Permissible Scope of Cease and Desist Orders: Legislation and 
Adjudication by the FTC, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 706, 711 (1962). 
96. 280 U.S. at 284-85 (footnote omitted). In S. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong. 2d Sess .. 13 
(1914), the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce explained the lack of substantive 
definitions in § 5: 
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Corrective advertising orders that require mention of past FTC 
holdings find even more explicit support in another section of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act. Section 6(£) authorizes the Com-
mission "to provide for the publication of its reports and decisions 
in such form and manner as may be best adapted £or public informa-
tion and use."97 In FTC v. Cinderella Career &- Finishing School, 
Inc.,98 the rationale of this statutory provision was articulated: 
I£ the unsophisticated consumer is to be protected in any measure 
from deceptive or unfair practices, it is essential that he be informed 
in some manner as to the identity of those most likely to prey upon 
him, utilizing such prohibited conduct. Certainly advice through 
news media as to actions being taken by a government agency in his 
behalf constitutes a prophylactic step addressed ultimately to the 
elimination of the conduct prohibited by the statute.99 
In Cinderella, the plaintiff, a respondent to a FTC proposed com-
plaint, had challenged the Commission's long-standing practice of is-
suing press releases on its complaints prior to any final adjudication 
of the charges. In denying plaintiff's request for an injunction 
against publicity the court made reference to the agency's broad 
discretion under section 6(£) to publicize its actions so as best to 
serve the public interest.100 But perhaps more important was the 
court's framing of the issue: 
We have no doubt that a press release of the kind herein involved 
results in a substantial tarnishing of the name, reputation, and 
status of the named respondent, throughout the related business 
community, as well as in the minds of some portion of the general 
public .... We are confronted, then, not with the question of 
whether the appellees have suffered actual damage, but whether the 
action of the Commission is authorized or permitted in law so as to 
place the appellees in the position of suffering damnum absque 
injuria.101 
Under this formulation, it is possible that even a clearly in-
jurious requirement as part of corrective advertising would not be 
labeled "punitive."102 Rather, it would be permitted as long as it was 
within the scope of the statutory discretion afforded the Commis• 
The Committee gave careful consideration to the question as to whether it would 
attempt to define the many and variable unfair practices which prevail in com• 
merce and to forbid their continuance or whether it would by a general dccla• 
ration condemning unfair practices, leave it to the Commission to determine what 
practices are unfair. It concluded that the latter course would be the better •••• 
97. 15 U.S.C. § 46(£) (1970) (emphasis added). 
98. 404 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
99. 404 F.2d at 1313. 
100. 404 F.2d at 1314. 
101. 404 F.2d at 1313. 
102. See note 69 supra and accompanying text. 
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sion and served the public interest.103 Section 6(£) could be viewed 
as conferring sufficiently broad discretion to allow the Commission 
to determine that the protection of the innocent consumer required 
publication of FTC findings in the "form and manner" of affirma-
tive disclosures by respondents in their future advertising rather 
than by the traditional press release. 
The Supreme Court in Lorain Journal Co. v. United States104 
allowed a district court similar discretion in shaping a corrective 
remedy in a case brought under the Sherman Act.105 The defendant 
newspaper company had illegally refused to accept the advertising of 
any merchant who also advertised on a local radio station that was in 
competition with the paper. To inform the merchants that their 
advertising would now be accepted, the lower court required the 
defendant to insert in its newspaper each week, for twenty-five 
weeks, a notice "fully apprising its readers of the substantive terms 
of the judgment."1os 
Lorain is an example of the common use of equitable powers 
pursuant to the Sherman Act to cure the "ill-effects" of illegal 
conduct as well as to arrest that conduct.107 Only through such 
remedies can violators be denied future benefit from their ·wrong-
doing.108 This is also a rationale for the use of divestiture in anti-
trust cases. Although not specifically provided for in the Sherman 
Act, divestiture is frequently resorted to in cases decided under the 
Act.109 In Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States,11° in which 
the defendant was required to divest itself of a number of wrong-
fully acquired theatres, the Supreme Court stated: 
In this type of case we start from the premise that an injunction 
against future violations is not adequate to protect the public 
interest. I£ all that was done was to forbid a repetition of the illegal 
103. The court in Cinderella made no reference to any specific limit to the Com-
mission's discretion under § 6(£). However, the same court indicated in a subsequent 
decision that in some (unspecified) instances, an agency could be enjoined from 
publicizing its activities. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 940 n.14 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). 
104. 342 U.S. 143 (1951). 
105. Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970), provides: 
The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurisdiction to 
prevent and restrain violations of [this Act]; and it shall be the duty of the several 
United States attorneys, in their respective districts • • • to institute proceedings 
in equity to prevent and restrain such violations ..•• 
106. See 342 U.S. at 158. In affirming the district court decree, the Supreme Court 
offered little insight into the standards of a publication requirement; it merely ob-
served that the publication decree should not impose "unnecessary restrictions." 342 
U.S. at 156. 
107. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 88 (1950). 
108. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 89 (1950). 
109. For a general discussion of divestiture under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 
see United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &: Co., 366 U.S. 316, 330 (1961). 
110. 334 U.S. 110 (1948). 
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conduct, those who had unlawfully built their empires could pre-
serve them intact .... To require divestiture of theatres unlawfully 
acquired is not to add to the penalties that Congress has provided 
for in the antitrust laws. Like restitution it merely deprives a de-
fendant of the gains from his wrongful conduct.111 
The aims of corrective advertising are similar. As in the case of the 
Sherman Act violator, the "empire" of the deceptive advertiser is 
an illegally obtained share of the market. Corrective advertising 
can be seen not as a penalty, but as an attempt to prevent the 
wrongdoer from enjoying that empire.112 
While the courts may have broad equitable powers under the 
Sherman Act, it does not necessarily follow that the FTC is granted 
the same latitude in dealing with unfair trade practices. Case law, 
however, does point in that direction. Although the Commission's 
basic power under the Federal Trade Commission Act is to be 
exercised through the issuance of cease-and-desist orders, the scope 
of such orders is broad.113 The Commission rarely recognizes the 
abandonment of a given practice as a defense to a cease-and-desist 
order.114 Furthermore, orders need not be confined to the particular 
practice that was the subject of the complaint, for the Supreme 
Court has stated: 
If the Commission is to attain the objectives Congress envisioned, it 
cannot be required to confine its road block to the narrow lane the 
transgressor has travelled; it must be allowed effectively to close all 
roads to the prohibited goal, so that its order may not be by-passed 
with impunity.11s 
The discretion possessed by administrative agencies to shape 
remedies has in fact been analogized to the powers of a court of 
equity.116 More specifically, the powers of the Federal Trade Com-
mission under section 5 have been likened to the equitable powers 
possessed by courts in antitrust cases.117 The scope of Commission 
concern under section 5 has been long recognized as encompassing 
many of the unfair trade practices prohibited by the Sherman Act. 
111. 334 U.S. at 128. 
112. See note 69 supra and accompanying text. 
113. See note 42 supra. 
114. See Sears, Roebuck &: Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919); Comment, TIie 
Defense of Abandonment in Proceedings Before the Federal Trade Commission, 49 
GEo. L.J. 722, 724 (1961). 
115. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952). The "prohibited goal" of 
the deceptive advertiser is not simply to publish a deceptive message; rather it is 
to profit from an increased share of the market. A cease-and-desist order alone is not 
a "roadblock" to that goal, assuming the deceptive campaign was successful. 
116. See NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 433, 436 (1941); Ekco 
Prods. Co., 65 F.T.C. 1163, 1221 (1964). 
117. See Ekco Prods. Co., 65 F.T.C. 1163, 1206-17 (1964) (Elman, C.). 
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In FTC v. Cement Institute,118 Justice Black stated: "[S]oon after 
its creation, the Commission began to interpret the prohibi-
tions of § 5 as including those restraints of trade which were also 
outlawed by the Sherman Act. . . . This Court has consistently 
approved that interpretation of the [Federal Trade Commission] 
Act."119 Despite this overlapping of concerns, in an earlier case the 
Court decided that the Commission when dealing with section 5 
violations does not possess all the powers of a court of equity under 
the Sherman Act. In FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co.,120 it was deter-
mined that the Commission did not have the power under section 
5 to order divestiture of stock or assets, even when such a remedy was 
recognized as necessary to effectively terminate the violation. The 
Court stated that if the respondent's conduct has "produced any 
unlawful status, the remedy must be administered by the courts in 
appropriate proceedings therein instituted."121 This case appears to 
stand in direct contradiction to later cases that repeatedly emphasize 
the Commission's broad remedial powers.122 
Although Eastman Kodak has never been expressly overruled, its 
holding has been severely eroded.123 Analogies to recent decisions 
would appear to support a conclusion that the Commission has 
under section 5(b) "a complete array of equitable remedies, includ-
ing divestiture and other remedies designed to effect structural 
reorganization."124 In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United 
States,125 the Supreme Court held that the Civil Aeronautics Board 
(CAB), pursuant to a provision in its enabling legislation modeled 
on section 5 of the FTC Act,126 has the power to order divestiture.127 
The Court rejected the argument that the power given the CAB to 
issue cease-and-desist orders is not broad enough to include the 
power to compel divestiture: "[W]here the problem lies within the 
purview of the Board . . . Congress must have intended to give it 
118. 333 U.S. 683 (1948). 
119. 333 U.S. at 691-92. 
120. 274 U.S. 619 (1927). 
121. 274 U.S. at 625. 
122. See, e.g., FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952). 
123. The Supreme Court stated in FTC v. Dean Foods, 384 U.S. 597, 606 n.4 
(1966), that Eastman Kodak had been "repudiated" by later cases. 
124. See Ekco Prods. Co., 65 F.T.C. 1163, 1213 (1964) (FTC power to order divesti-
ture under § 7 of the Clayton Act). 
125. 371 U.S. 296 (1963). 
126. Federal Aviation Act § 411, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970), provides in part: "The 
l3oard may ••• investigate and determine whether any air carrier, foreign air carrier 
or ticket agent has been or is engaged in unfair or deceptive practices or unfair 
methods of competition in air transportation or sale thereof." It also empowers the 
board to issue cease-and-desist orders, which are the only remedies referred to in 
the section. 
127. !171 U.S. at 312. 
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authority ample to deal with the evil at hand."128 The Court likened 
the authority of agencies in molding administrative decrees to the 
authority of courts in framing injunctive decrees.120 
During the same term, in Gilbertville Trucking Co. v. United 
States,130 the Court recognized the power of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission to require divestiture even though that remedy 
was not expressly authorized in the Interstate Commerce Act.181 It 
relied on section 5(7) of that Act, which allows the Commission to 
"take such actions as may be necessary in the opinion of the Com-
mission to prevent continuance of such [ an essentially antitrust] 
violation."132 The Commission's authority was analogized to the 
power of the courts to order divestiture under the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts when they find such action is necessary for "effective 
relief. "133 
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decisions in Pan American 
and Gilbertville, the Sixth Circuit upheld the power of the FTC 
under section 5 to order a res_tructuring of the market place. In 
Charles Pfizer & Co. v. FTC,134 a group of drug firms were accused 
by the Commission of conspiring to withhold pertinent information 
on the "miracle drug" tetracycline from the United States Patent 
Office. On the basis of incomplete information concerning the 
drug's uniqueness, a patent was issued allowing respondents to reap 
enormous profits from their resulting monopoly. The Commission 
found the withholding of information to be an unfair trade prac-
tice.135 Pursuant to section 5 it ordered the respondents to issue a 
nondiscriminatory, nonexclusive license for the manufacture of the 
drug to any party requesting it.136 The Commission order was 
clearly aimed at depriving the respondents of the fruits of their 
·wrongdoing. 
The Commission should be able to take similar appropriate 
action to restructure the market when the unfair trade practice takes 
the form of deceptive advertising. Although there may be other 
means of divestiture in deceptive advertising cases, corrective ad-
vertising, depending as it does on consumer choice, would seem to 
involve the least governmental tampering with the market.137 How-
128. 371 U.S. at 312. 
129. 371 U.S. at 312 n.17. 
130. 371 U.S. ll5 (1962). 
131. Codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (1970). 
132. 49 u.s.c. § 5(7) (1970). 
133. 371 U.S. at 130. 
134. 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969). 
135. American Cyanamid Co., 63 F.T.C. 1747, 1805-06 (1963). 
136. American Cyanamid Co., 63 F.T.C. 1747, 1910 (1963). 
137. It is not self-evident that public programs that rely on "natural" market forces 
and the least government "interference" are the most effective, the most inexpensive, 
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ever, if corrective advertising proves ineffective, or administratively 
expensive, more direct means of divestiture adapted from antitrust 
law may be required. 
Corrective advertising can be expected to accomplish divestiture 
only within certain limits of precision. Even if it were possible to 
determine precisely how much of the market was gained through 
deceptive advertising, corrective advertising would not return the 
market to its exact condition prior to the violation. No matter how 
effective the messages, the market distribution for bread cannot be 
expected to return to what it was prior to Profile's weight reduction 
claims. As a result of corrective advertising, the buyers of Profile 
Bread may tum to a new brand, or, if they are diet-conscious, stop 
buying bread entirely. Corrective advertising, despite such irregulari-
ties, could still make an important contribution toward accomplish-
ing one of the central aims of commercial regulation. Like divesti-
ture, corrective advertising might serve to prevent the wrongdoer, 
the disrupter of the market place, from finding his conduct profit-
able. Whether it will in fact so operate can only be determined after 
an evaluation of the effects of a number of corrective advertising 
orders. 
V. CORRECTIVE ADVERTISING IN PRACTICE 
While corrective advertising is within the ambit of the FTC's 
authority, its beneficial effects must be weighed against its potential 
for economic disruption. Unfortunately, little is known about the 
effects corrective advertising will have upon individual businesses. 
There are those who liken corrective advertising to a "corporate 
hara kiri."138 One columnist reportedly suggested that it threatens 
the very underpinnings of the Republic.139 
Still others predict that Madison Avenue will easily meet the 
challenge and that corrective advertising will be either so bland that 
it will fail to awaken the consumer or so sincere in its apologies that 
it will win new customers for the deceptive advertiser.140 It has been 
suggested that the limited experience of the Food and Drug Ad-
or even the most protective of individual liberty. Means of divestiture other than 
corrective advertising might better satisfy these criteria. If lack of government inter-
vention is really the primary concern, a program of government subsidized counter-
advertising by the wrongdoers' competitors might be called for. 
138. See Address by Robert Pitofsky, Director of the FTC Bureau of Consumer 
Affairs, to Association of Advertising Agencies May 14, 1971, at 10, on file with the 
Michigan Law Review [hereinafter Pitofsky Address]. 
139. Id. at 10. 
140. "If indeed it turns out that honesty sells (the thought boggles the mind) we 
can visualize advertisers standing in line begging the FTC to make them run cor-
rective advertising. And then the FTC's big weapon might be to require advertisers 
to continue to run their old hard-sell stuff as a penalty for their misdeeds." Editorial, 
Advertising Age, Oct. 4, 1971, at 14, col. 2. 
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ministration (FDA) with corrective advertising tentatively indicates 
that its effect on the advertiser will not be devastating.141 The FDA 
has required certain drug manufacturers to place advertisements in 
professional journals to inform doctors of previous erroneous claims 
made for various preparations.142 Apparently no dramatic market 
shifts have occurred.143 
The first chance to assess corrective advertising in depth will 
come with the Profile Bread campaign, the results of which will be 
watched carefully.144 Proponents of corrective advertising would no 
doubt like to see a measurable drop in the bread's sales. If the sales 
decline toward the level existing at the onset of the deception, the 
theory of corrective advertising will be validated. The unlikely event 
of a complete collapse in Profile's sales would pose a severe challenge 
to the doctrine.145 
The success of corrective advertising is important in another re• 
spect. Critics of the FTC have for decades noted the agency's "lack of 
teeth" in the area of deceptive advertising.146 If corrective advertis• 
ing proves to be effective but not destructive in its first use, the Com-
mission may begin to fulfill its statutory mandate in the area of 
national advertising. A well-administered program of corrective 
advertising might cause advertisers to respond to Commission ag-
gressiveness by upgrading their messages, rather than risking the 
negative publicity associated with a corrective advertising order. On 
the other hand, corrective advertising might have the effect of 
causing advertisers to delete all factual claims from their messages. 
Instead they would emanate a stream of drivel that could not be 
found false. At that point, the Commission would have to decide 
whether it should exercise even greater control over the content of 
the advertising. It might find, for example, that failure to provide 
sufficiently factual advertisements is an unfair trade practice.147 A 
141. See Pitofsky Address, supra note 138, at 10. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. One explanation why the Commission agreed to the relatively mild order in 
the Profile Bread case (see note 20 supra and accompanying text) is that it was interested 
in getting any form of corrective advertising into operation in order to demonstrate 
that it would not, in practice, prove disastrous to a c~mpany. 
145. It is also possible that sales might increase or not be affected at all. It was 
reported in Advertising Age, Oct. 4, 1971, at 14, col. 1, that the makers of Profile are 
pleased with their corrective advertisement and are prepared to run more than the 
required 25% if sales "respond." 
146. See ABA REPORT, supra note 67, at 43. 
147. The quest for greater accuracy and content in advertising is intimately en-
twined with increasing comprehension of the role of mass advertising in supporting 
oligopolistic conditions in many industries by making market entry costs prohibitive. 
The FTC does not appear to be at the point of directly prescribing limits on the 
amount of advertising. However, to the extent that advertising could be made factual, 
its oligopolistic effects might be reduced. Given factual advertising, the entry costs 
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step in this direction has already been taken with a recently proposed 
trade regulation rule requiring the posting of gasoline octane ratings 
at point of sale.148 
The benefit derived from corrective advertising will depend 
heavily on the ability of the FTC to control its use. Corrective 
advertising is most easily justified in the context of major national 
advertising campaigns where the residual effects can be reasonably 
identified. The Commission-initiated corrective advertising cases 
have been of this nature.149 There is some question whether even 
the Firestone campaign furnished a proper vehicle for considering 
the merits of corrective advertising. It occurred some three years 
before the FTC proceedings and consisted largely of print adver-
tising run for a relatively short period.150 The Commission has been 
frequently accused of devoting its resources to low priority mat-
ters.161 Corrective advertising provides an opportunity for effective 
enforcement on a national level. However, like a number of good 
ideas before it, corrective advertising could fall victim to a myriad 
of petty cases. 
The Commission has shmvn flexibility in shaping corrective 
advertising complaints. American Home Products Corp.152 concerns 
allegedly deceptive product demonstrations on television. Black Flag 
Ant and Roach Killer (with Baygon) was shown on television to have 
for a firm with a distinctive product are lessened since its advertising is not buried 
in a welter of frivolous claims by the oligopolists. Furthermore, as oligopolists wish to 
avoid price competition in the sale of what are essentially the same products, present 
advertising allows them to create frivolous product differentiation. 
148. Proposed Trade Regulation Rule § 422.I, 34 Fed. Reg. 12449 (1969). This post-
ing might lead consumers to choose gasoline on the basis of octane rating rather than 
on brand identification, which, in tum, might force gasoline companies to compete on 
the basis of price rather than on spurious product differentiation. In a related matter, 
Sun Oil Company was recently cited in a proposed complaint for allegedly misrepre-
senting the uniqueness of its gasolines. The complaint asserts that all gasolines, regard-
less of brand name, will ensure efficient performance and maximum power of an 
engine if sufficient octane is provided. The proposed complaint calls for corrective 
advertising. Sun Oil Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 19,856 (FTC 1971). 
149. The one exception is a consent order obtained by the Commission several 
months before the Profile Bread case. In the earlier consent order, a Hawaiian television 
wholesaler agreed to print an advertisement retracting previous deceptive claims. The 
one corrective advertisement was to be placed in the same spot in the same newspaper. 
Matsushita Elec., Inc., 3 CCH T,RADE REG. REP. 1[ 19,430 (FTC 1971). 
150. For these reasons, despite the Commission's recent espousal of corrective 
advertising, it is by no means certain that it will overturn the trial examiner's findings 
in Firestone. See text accompanying note 16 supra. 
151. See ABA REPORT, supra note 67, at 77; Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commis-
sion: Internal Organization and Procedure, 48 MINN. L. REv. 383, 390-417 (1964). 
This is not to say that the Commission should not consider using corrective adver-
tising as a means of regulating the small operator. See text accompanying note 60 
supra. However, it should carefully weigh such a policy against its administrative costs 
and in terms of the over-all priorities of the Commission in the field of deceptive 
advertising. 
152. 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 19,673 (FTC 1971) (proposed complaint). 
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a superior roach-killing ability when compared to a competing 
product. If the ban on future deceptive demonstrations is ineffective, 
the Commission wants the demonstration conducted again so that 
viewers can see what happens when the company does not use a 
particular breed of roach that has developed an immunity to the 
active ingredient in "Brand X."153 
In addition to such variation in content and style, the placement, 
frequency, and duration of corrective advertising afford potential for 
a flexible approach by the Commission. It is hoped that this potential 
will not be lost through a mechanistic, bureaucratic approach. Yet, 
these variables are also the source of some problems. The basic 
question is how one utilizes them in a combination that will elimi-
nate the residual effects of deception in the most precise fashion. 
The permutations are innumerable. If the deceptive advertising 
appeared only on television, should corrective advertising also be 
confined to television on the theory that the same audience will be 
reached? Or, in the case of a particularly effective televised decep· 
tion that netted a significant share of the market, should corrective 
advertising be required in all media, and on the packaging of the 
product itself? The answers to these questions are not immediately 
apparent. Designing corrective advertising remedies will resemble 
the work presently done by advertising agencies. Eventually the 
Commission should develop its own expertise in media balance and 
effective production techniques as they relate to corrective adver-
tising. 
Guidelines may be developed to determine the amount of cor-
rective advertising that is needed to respond to a given deceptive 
campaign. If the deception is relatively insignificant, when com-
pared to the whole campaign for the product or service in question, 
corrective advertising is probably not called for. In instances of 
gross deception, the twenty-five per cent figure currently used by the 
Commission may prove too low. The amount of corrective advertis-
ing has thus far been proposed as a mathematical function of the 
amount of advertising by the respondent in the future.104 The re-
spondent might suspend all advertising and in this way avoid correc-
tive advertising. On the assumption that a company's failure to 
advertise for a year may be as effective as corrective advertising 
153. 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1f 19,673, at 21,721-22. 
154. An exception to this policy has been made in a recent proposed complaint, 
which calls for at least one corrective advertisement to be run in each magazine in 
which the questioned advertising previously appeared. Sugar Assn., Inc., 3 CCH TRADE 
REG. REP. ,r 19,857 (FTC 1971). Respondents are two sugar industry trade associations 
that have allegedly deceptively advertised that eating foods containing sugar before 
meals contributes to weight reduction. Robert Pitofsky, director of the FTC's Bureau 
of Consumer Protection, told a news conference that the new policy was necessary 
because the associations, unlike companies advertising their own products, might other• 
wise suspend all advertising for a year. N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1971, at 27, col. 1. 
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would be in restructuring the market, perhaps the FTC policy would 
still be vindicated. 
If corrective advertising does prove effective in causing a decline 
in the deceptive advertiser's market share, questions concerning the 
proper limits for this "divestiture" will no doubt arise. In the case 
of a firm that has advertised deceptively from its inception, that 
firm's entire market share might be said to be the product of unfair 
trade practices. Is the goal of corrective advertising to drive such a 
firm out of business? Closer examination of the problem should 
result in a Commission attempt to determine what portion of the 
firm's market share is the product of the deceptive quality of the 
advertising. The firm would be allowed to maintain that share of 
the market that would have resulted regardless of the content of 
the advertising. However, in the case of a particularly gross decep-
tion, to which a firm owes its entire existence, perhaps the FTC 
should not shirk from ending that firm's operations completely.155 
Another problem might arise in the case of a firm that has in-
creased its share of the market from ten per cent to thirty-five per 
cent through deceptive advertising, leaving its only competitor with 
the remaining sixty-five per cent. Should the Commission act to 
restore the competitor's control of ninety per cent of the market by 
requiring corrective advertising?156 The best response to such ques-
tions is that the Commission must retain flexibility in administering 
corrective advertising. This remedy should not be automatically 
used in every case. A blanket rule of corrective advertising will not 
further the public interest. 
Corrective advertising will make significant demands on the 
skills and resources of the Commission. An American Bar Associa-
tion Committee Report157 and the work of two skillful chairmen 
have resulted in an appearance of a revitalized agency.158 Corrective 
advertising can be an important new remedy as the Commission 
seeks to respond to contemporary demands for consumer protection. 
155. Of course, there are going to be some situations in which the misleading 
claims for a product have been so outlandish and the amounts spent on adver-
tising so enormous that corrective advertising could be a mortal blow to certain 
brands. But that's because the false advertising created massive consumer decep-
tion-not because the remedy is not appropriate to the violation. 
Pitofsky Address, supra note 1!!8, at 11. 
156. Cf. Crown Cent. Petroleum, !l CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1f 19,605 (FTC 1971); 
Swift &: Co., !I CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1[ 19,476 (FTC 1971). 
157. ABA REPORT, supra note 67. 
158, However, the FTC has been "reorganized" so many times before that some 
cynicism is justified. See ABA REPORT, supra note 67, at 92 (separate statement of R. 
Posner). 
